What this page shows
The world balance behind the strait: how much supply the war removed, and what absorbed it.- 2026 vs 2025 — world production and consumption against the same months last year, and a decomposition of the supply shortfall into demand destruction, storage draws and the stock build that didn't happen.
- Gulf producers — each producer's output change vs 2025: who lost barrels, who could bypass the strait.
- US imports from the Persian Gulf — the most direct importer-side witness to the closure, monthly.
- OPEC vs non-OPEC — whether non-Gulf producers are backfilling the loss.
- US product demand — where (and whether) demand destruction shows up in the one economy EIA breaks out by product.
Data: EIA STEO October 2026 edition (observed through Jul 2026; later months are EIA estimates, drawn dashed)
· EIA PSM imports through 2026-06
· refreshed 2026-10-21 02:21 UTC
Supply shortfall vs 2025
1,598 M bbl
production below the same months of 2025
Demand destruction
644 M bbl
consumption below 2025 · 40% of the gap
Storage draw
446 M bbl
consumption above production · 28% of the gap
Foregone stock build
508 M bbl
2025 ran a surplus that could not recur · 32%
Left: world production and consumption this year (dashed = EIA estimate) against the same months last
year. Right: how each month's supply shortfall (white line) was absorbed —
demand destruction, storage draw and
foregone build; the three sum to the shortfall by identity.
| Producer | Mar– 2025 | Mar– 2026 | Δ |
|---|---|---|---|
| Saudi Arabia | 9.35 | 7.13 | -24% |
| Iraq | 4.34 | 2.34 | -46% |
| Kuwait | 2.48 | 1.28 | -48% |
| Iran | 3.37 | 2.66 | -21% |
| Oman | 0.77 | 0.85 | +10% |
| Bahrain | 0.18 | 0.06 | -67% |
Each line is a producer's output minus its own output in the same month of 2025, so the war-driven loss reads
directly off the axis; the table gives March-onward averages. Saudi Arabia (Petroline) and Oman (already outside the strait)
are the bypass-capable producers; Iraq and Kuwait have no seaborne alternative. STEO itemizes only OPEC/OPEC+ members, so
the UAE and Qatar are not available here.
The most direct demand-side witness to the strait closure: US refiners' intake of Persian Gulf crude
(series MCRIMUSPG2). Latest: 2026-06 = 113 kb/d
vs 524 kb/d in the same month a year earlier. Red bars = March 2026 onward.
Is the Gulf loss being backfilled? Left: OPEC and non-OPEC total liquids, this year (dashed = estimate) vs last.
Right: the year-on-year change in each, stacked; the white line is the world net change. Caveat: producers that have
left OPEC (the UAE among them) sit inside the non-OPEC aggregate, which masks growth elsewhere.
Where demand destruction lands by product, for the one economy STEO breaks out: gasoline, jet fuel, distillate,
residual and total US consumption as year-on-year differences. STEO has no world-level product split; a flat US line
means the world's demand destruction happened elsewhere (Asian and other non-OECD importers).
| Region | Mar–Oct 2025 | Mar–Oct 2026 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| China | 16.45 | 15.74 | -0.71 (-4.3%) |
| Other Asia | 14.85 | 14.55 | -0.30 (-2.0%) |
| Non-OECD total | 58.12 | 56.32 | -1.80 (-3.1%) |
| United States | 20.79 | 20.57 | -0.22 (-1.0%) |
| OECD Europe | 13.72 | 13.50 | -0.22 (-1.6%) |
| Japan | 2.95 | 2.77 | -0.18 (-6.2%) |
| OECD total | 46.44 | 45.47 | -0.96 (-2.1%) |
Averages in M bbl/day for March onward (the war months); totals overlap their members.
Where the demand destruction landed, by region. Each line is a region's consumption minus its consumption in the same month of
2025, so a line below zero means that region is using less oil than a year ago. Non-OECD total includes China and Other Asia;
OECD total includes the United States, OECD Europe and Japan. Months after Jul 2026 are EIA estimates (dashed). The regional split
is the closest STEO gets to showing who absorbed the Hormuz shortfall: Asian importers depend most on Gulf crude, so their lines usually fall first.