Can Oil Bypass the Strait of Hormuz?
Roughly a fifth of the world's petroleum normally leaves the Persian Gulf by sea, and every one of those barrels has to pass the Strait of Hormuz — unless it can travel by pipeline to a port on the other side. Only two countries built that insurance before the 2026 war, and their combined capacity covers well under half of normal seaborne flow. This page lays out exactly what the bypass options are, what they can realistically carry, and where that leaves everyone else.
The two real bypass pipelines
| Pipeline | Route | Nameplate capacity | Realistic max |
|---|---|---|---|
| East–West Pipeline ("Petroline"), Saudi Arabia | Abqaiq → Yanbu (Red Sea) | ~5 M bbl/day | ~7 M bbl/day with drag-reducing agents |
| Habshan–Fujairah (ADCOP), UAE | Abu Dhabi fields → Fujairah (Gulf of Oman) | ~1.5 M bbl/day | ~1.8 M bbl/day |
Petroline is the only large-volume escape route. It moves Saudi crude west to the Red Sea, from where tankers sail via the Suez Canal or around Africa. Its practical ceiling is well below nameplate on a sustained basis, and using it means longer voyages, different loading infrastructure, and exposure to a second chokepoint at Bab el-Mandeb — a strait with its own security problems.
Habshan–Fujairah lets the UAE deliver a large share of its crude directly to the Fujairah terminal on the Gulf of Oman, past the strait entirely. Fujairah has grown into a major bunkering and export hub partly for this reason. The line covers much of Abu Dhabi's export volume, but nothing of its neighbours'. In May 2026 the UAE announced an accelerated expansion intended to roughly double the line's capacity by 2027 — a direct response to the war, but not capacity that exists today.
The partial and theoretical options
- Iran — Goreh–Jask: designed for 1 M bbl/day to a terminal at Jask, east of the strait; in practice it has operated far below design, at a few hundred thousand barrels per day at best. It exists precisely so Iran could keep exporting if the strait closed.
- Iraq — Kirkuk–Ceyhan (Turkey): around 0.5 M bbl/day when operating, but it serves northern fields, has been offline or disputed for long stretches, and does nothing for Basra's southern exports — the bulk of Iraqi production.
- Saudi Arabia — IPSA/Trans-Arabian routes: mothballed or repurposed legacy lines occasionally cited as reactivation candidates; not a near-term factor.
LNG has no bypass at all
Qatar, one of the world's largest LNG exporters, ships every cargo through the strait. There is no gas pipeline alternative to Asian or European buyers, and LNG cannot be rerouted overland. When the strait is disrupted, Qatari LNG simply stops or sails at elevated risk — which is why LNG carrier transits are one of the most sensitive indicators on our live dashboard.
How big is the gap?
Add up every bypass generously — Petroline at surge capacity, ADCOP at maximum, Goreh–Jask working — and you reach roughly 8–9 M bbl/day of theoretical pipeline capacity, much of it not actually spare. Pre-war seaborne flow through Hormuz ran around 20 M bbl/day. In other words: pipelines can, at best, replace less than half of normal flow, they mostly protect Saudi and Emirati barrels, and they leave Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, southern Iraq and most of Iran entirely dependent on the strait.